McCaffrey's Parting Shots Belie the Facts | ||
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It's supremely ironic that General Barry McCaffrey, the most visible
and longest serving drug czar-- the one who promoted more drug arrests
than any other and is the chief apologist for the first acknowledged
overseas military adventure to support the drug war-- left office
during a week in which the policy he headed is facing harsh criticism
at home and a daunting overseas test. Beyond that; a film which seems
certain to become both box-office hit and nominee for several Academy
Awards just opened to critical acclaim. While that criticism is
variable with respect to the film's portrayal of many drug war details,
it's nearly unanimous in acknowledging our policy to be an expensive
failure. | ||
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Against this backdrop, McCaffrey's departing claim that the drug war is
really successful, but just needing more money and commitment, is
nothing short of ludicrous. Since he was not a powerful "czar" with
actual police powers, but really functioned as designated government
lobbyist for a global criminal industry, his tenure can be seen as a
monumental failure-- with more on the way. | ||
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Our drug policy rests on a simplistic premise: "certain drugs are so
evil, they must be outlawed." The counter is: "the criminal drug
markets created by policy produce far more social damage than the drugs
themselves." Whatever its limitations, that seems to be the message
most readily derived from "Traffic." Given our recently acknowledged
criminal justice excesses, racial profiling, police scandals, and
"exploding" markets for both club drugs and methamphetamine, that
counter argument will resonate as never before. | ||
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The nomination of a fundamentalist drug hawk to be Attorney General
should be seen as just another opportunity to make the same case even
more effectively. Likewise, the possible denial of medical necessity by
a less than pristine Supreme Court represents an opportunity to further
discredit our embattled policy. This is not a time for timid arguments
or half measures and compromises which implicitly agree with a need for
criminal markets; it's a time to capitalize on the two greatest
weaknesses of the drug war: neither its rationale nor its results can
stand much intelligent scrutiny. | ||
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Tom O'Connell | ||
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The NY Times interview with Gen. McCaffrey, I thought that reviewing a
few items from his final National Drug Control Strategy 2001 Annual
Report and from the drug control office's own 1991-2001 budget
comparison would be helpful in putting the General's comments into
context. | ||
| Mandatory minimums/crack-powder disparity: from the NY Times: | ||
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"He called it 'silly' for federal law to impose harsher penalties for
selling or possessing crack cocaine than for powder cocaine because
they are two forms of the same drug." | ||
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"He criticized predetermined prison sentences for drug felons, like
those set under New York's Rockefeller-era drug laws. 'I am unalterably
opposed to the system of mandatory minimums,' he said. 'I think we need
to give this authority back to the judges.'" | ||
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And here's what ONDCP's 2001 annual report recommends: | ||
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"The Administration recommends that federal sentencing treat crack as
ten times worse than powder, not one hundred times worse. Specifically,
the amount of powder cocaine required to trigger a five-year mandatory
sentence would be reduced from five hundred to two hundred and fifty
grams while the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger the same
sentence would increase from five grams to twenty-five grams.... The
Administration also recommends that mandatory minimums be abolished for
simple possession of crack." | ||
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National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report, issued Jan. 4, 2001,
pp. 87-88 | ||
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Prevention funding: from the NY Times interview: | ||
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"Since General McCaffrey took office, federal financing has increased
by 55 percent for prevention programs and by 34 percent for treatment
programs. 'It's been hard lifting, but we've made the arguments that
resulted in $2.78 billion in federal money going into drug treatment,'
he said."" | ||
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The 2001 Annual Report notes: | ||
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"Between FY 1996 and FY 2000, prevention funding increased by 48
percent -- second only to the percentage increase in international
funding. Increases for prevention programs were targeted at Goal 1 of
the Strategy, 'Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal
drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.' The establishment of ONDCP's
youth media campaign, funding for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) State Incentive Grants program,
increased funding for Youth Tobacco prevention in the Department of
Health and Human Services and additional funding for Office of Justice
Programs drug prevention activities represent several of the key budget
priorities supporting the strategy." | ||
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National Drug Control Strategy: 2001 Annual Report, issued Jan. 4,
2001, p. 118. | ||
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Actual Drug Budget Figures in Dollars: | ||
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1993 $2,251.6 Billion 1996 $2,553.8 Billion 2000 $3,147.0 Billion (estimated) | ||
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1993 $1,556.4 Billion 1996 $1,400.7 Billion 2000 $2,064.5 Billion (estimated) | ||
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1993 $4,214.3 Billion 1996 $4,691.9 Billion 2000 $5,953.2 Billion | ||
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1993 $5,922.3 Billion 1996 $7,393.7 Billion 2000 $9,035.7 Billion (estimated) | ||
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| http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/budget00/exec_summ.html | ||
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Doug McVay, Projects Coordinator Common Sense for Drug Policy, http://www.csdp.org/ |