Mexico,
U.S., both losers in our misguided drug war
By EVA BERTRAM and KENNETH SHARPE
"Progress"
and "cooperation" are the official watchwords Washington likes
to use to describe the U.S.-backed drug war in Mexico. The cheery rhetoric
is essential to protecting relations with Mexico. When reality intrudes
and the official drug-war story threatens to unravel, the story is revised.
Just how deeply corrupting the drug war is on Mexico's political institutions
and, ultimately, on U.S.-Mexican interests is glossed over, if mentioned
at all.
The most
recent need for damage control came with news that top investigators
in a new, U.S.-trained anti-drug unit in the Mexican attorney general's
office may have ties to powerful drug cartels. Some senior officials
of the elite unit failed lie-detector tests, giving rise to concerns
that high-level drug investigations, and sensitive intelligence shared
by U.S. agents, may have been compromised.
It's a
too-familiar story. The unit was created, with great fanfare and talk
about progress and cooperation, 18 months ago, after the chief of its
predecessor, Gen. Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, was arrested in February
1997 for selling protection to one of the country's most powerful drug
lords. Ironically, Gutierrez had been packaged as a step forward. U.S.
drug-policy director Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey called him a man of great
"integrity ... patriotic, honest, dedicated." Gutierrez had
been brought in to rebuild the previous anti-drug agency, which also
had been created to replace a corrupted predecessor.
Gutierrez's
appointment was part of a much-trumpeted move by President Ernesto Zedillo
to draft the military into anti-drug enforcement, after the ineffectiveness
and corruption of the civilian police force became overwhelming. Despite
warnings from critics on both sides of the border about involving the
military in a civilian law-enforcement mission, U.S. officials shamelessly
pushed Zedillo to call in the troops. The military would get tough with
the drug traffickers, and its more professional image would play well
in the United States.
But now
the drug war is corrupting the military. Last year, information gleaned
from Mexican defense-ministry files indicated that 10 generals and 22
other military officers were under investigation for alleged ties to
traffickers. In early September, 40 soldiers, all trained by elite U.S.
Special Forces, were removed from duty at the Mexico City airport after
investigators alleged that the soldiers had helped smuggle cocaine-filled
suitcases into the United States.
Despite
the shadow cast by all this negative news on the drug war, the United
States and Mexico continue to spin stories about bilateral cooperation,
because painting Mexico as an unreliable ally in our drug war threatens
other U.S. interests. Good-neighbor relations with Mexico are essential
to protect the commerce created by free trade and the steady flow of
investments, loans, tourists, oil and immigrant labor between the two
countries. These relations so deeply affect the economies, environment,
labor and stock markets, banking systems and human rights in both countries,
and demand such constant good will in negotiations, that neither government
can allow Mexico to be branded a bad neighbor in drug control.
So both
sides repeatedly invent "bold new initiatives" in the drug
war: new anti-drug units, new screening mechanisms, new training programs.
Both sides publicize arrests of corrupt officials and drug busts. The
initiatives and announcements are then trumpeted as evidence of progress
and cooperation. When reality blows the cover stories apart, U.S. officials
wring their hands in dismay, shake their fingers at the Mexicans, then
invent another bold new initiative to show that all is still cooperation
and progress.
But these
official stories do more than mislead. They conceal a second, more dangerous
myth: If only the Mexicans and other Latin governments would seriously
fight the U.S.-sponsored drug war, we could ameliorate abuse and addiction
in the United States. This reassuring fairy tale blinds us to the ways
in which high profits and porous borders doom the war on drug traffickers
from the outset.
By driving
up and sustaining prices, the drug war ensures the trade's high profits.
For example, a gram of cocaine would probably fetch around $15 a gram
in the absence of a drug war; it currently commands approximately $150.
Yet, the war on supply will never drive the price high enough to lower
addiction in the United States. Rather, it will maintain profits at
levels sufficient to ensure a seemingly endless supply of traffickers
and to generate the estimated $6 billion a year these traffickers spend
on bribes in Mexico alone, bribes used to corrupt police and military
officers, judges and politicians.
Drugs also
are so easy to smuggle that there are always new ways to elude border
controls. McCaffrey reported that U.S. border inspectors searched more
than 1 million railway cars and commercial trucks entering from Mexico
last year. They found cocaine on six occasions. Growing border traffic,
promoted by U.S. free-trade policies, makes the interdiction task even
more daunting: In 1996, 75 million cars and 3.5 million trucks and railway
cars entered the United States from Mexico. Even with the best cooperation
and minimum corruption, interdiction as a strategy is not going to produce
much progress on drug problems in the United States.
On another
level, a dogged pursuit of the drug war tends to undermine many important
interests we share with Mexico. U.S. pressure on Mexico to get its military
involved in the drug war is at crosscurrents with the democratization
of Mexico, a goal central to U.S. policy. The Mexican military is increasingly
charged with abusing human rights, a problem that may worsen. As U.S.
training and resources make soldiers better able to track and apprehend
drug traffickers, they become more efficient at extracting higher payoffs
for nonenforcement. The more we unwittingly encourage this corruption
and turn a blind eye to human rights abuses, the more difficult it will
be to build and sustain democratically accountable security forces in
Mexico.
The drug
war already has poisoned U.S. relations with Mexico. When the United
States conducted Operation Casablanca, an undercover sting on Mexican
soil, earlier this year, it did not inform the Mexican government of
the operation on the ground that Mexicans couldn't be trusted with the
information. After 26 Mexican bankers were indicted for money laundering
as a result of the sting, the Mexican government reacted angrily. Zedillo
urged, "We must all respect the sovereignty of each nation so that
no one can become the judge of others and no one feels entitled to violate
other countries' laws for the sake of enforcing its own." U.S.
officials claimed they had alerted Mexican authorities of the sting,
but the operation left relations strained.
Regrettably,
stories to protect Mexico's image as a loyal drug-war ally will continue
to be told and retold, and they will continue to be dashed by reality.
But as debate focuses on how much progress we are making against the
widening corruption in Mexico, we risk missing a deeper truth. Fighting
drug abuse at home through a war on supply abroad is not good policy,
and it will make us both bad neighbors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bertram, policy analyst, and Sharpe, professor of political science
at
Swarthmore College, in Pennsylvania, are co-authors of Drug War Politics
.
|