TAKING THE INITIATIVE, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

The opposition to Proposal M took three forms: CADCA/ONDCP, various politicians including Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm, Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, and (with a couple exceptions) the mainstream news media.

CADCA/ONDCP's main front groups were the Partnership for a Drug Free Detroit (PDFD) and the Empowerment Zone Coalition both of which got Federal anti-drug dollars to "educate" the public on the dangers of drug abuse and stop the problem as they see best - through a combination of education, treatment and punishment.

In this campaign, PDFD et al., was the tip of the spear in the effort to stop Proposal M from passing at the ballot box. PDFD's major tactic was to stir up fear and outrage in voter minds and spread misinformation about the proposal. In addition to their federal, state and locally funded salaries, which enable some of them to work full time against the proposal, PDFD also received a $5,000 grant from the City of Detroit Community Health Department to pay for anti-medical marijuana flyers and t-shirts.

In Michigan and many other states, it is legal for a municipality to spend taxpayer dollars to educate voters about local issues - millages, initiatives, and the like. In Detroit, it was decided to use taxpayer money to educate Detroit voters as to why "Medical Marijuana is BAD for Detroit." A formal complaint filed by DCCC with the Michigan Secretary of State, charging the City of Detroit with violation of campaign against a ballot proposal, was summarily rejected, based upon state law as interpreted by the Secretary of State. A strategic decision was made by DCCC to move on and not pursue the matter in court.

We were, nevertheless, very aggressive in filing "Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA) requests against the Governor's Office, the Michigan Attorney General, ONDCP, PDFD, CADCA, the Oakland County Prosecutor and Sheriff, and any other public entities we suspected might attempt to use taxpayer dollars illegally, i.e., to openly oppose Proposal M rather than merely "educate" about it (though the reality is that this ends up being the classic "distinction without a difference.") As legally entitled, we demanded records of all meetings, e-mails and any other communications and financial records pertaining to Proposal M from these and other agencies.

It is our belief, that these legal requests, at least, had a chilling effect, and may have curbed overtly illegal advocacy on the part of the government with respect to campaign finance law violations.

In any event, and despite it resources, PDFD's effort to engender fear among voters - and especially within the ranks of Detroit's powerful African American Baptist Church leadership - ultimately failed. The church leaders could not form a consensus on the issue.

PDFD surrogate, State Representative Alma Stallworth, who's son Keith had recently been forced to resign from the Michigan Legislature in a federal felony plea bargain (in which, among other things, he was accused of accepting tax-evading loans from drug dealers to prop up the failing Tiger Lounge strip bar in which he allegedly had a secret ownership), carried the fight in the Michigan House of Representatives. The State House passed her resolution condemning the concept of medical marijuana by a vote of 93-17. The House resolution never specifically mentioned Detroit, widely covered by most mainstream media outlets.

Finally, PDFD worked from the ground up. Addicts and drug war victims in the many rehabilitation and drug treatment facilities in Detroit were urged as part of their "recovery" to participate in the fight against Proposal M. PDFD meetings took on all the characteristics of 12-Step/religious revival meetings.

"My name be Tamika Wilson*, and I wanna thank Frank Johnson* at "New Horizon" for savin' my life. I be clean now, and I workin' ever' day to stop dat medicinal marijuana in Deetroit," proclaimed Ms. Wilson, among others, to the delight of recovery experts, politicians, law enforcement personnel and PDFD reformers in attendance. *[the names are fictitious but the quote is authentic].

Ultimately, PDFD played its final gambit in the waning days of the campaign - the always reliable "race card." I was personally attacked by PDFD reformers on a local cable TV show as a closet drug addict and a white "outsider" who had no right to speak for the "black folks" in Detroit. In addition, it was suggested that I was a shill for white billionaires who want to "re-enslave" African Americans on drugs. (Incidentally, I am a 30-year Detroit resident.)

DCCC's response to all this was to simply stay relentlessly on message, i.e., "We're talking about medicine for sick people - nothing else," never stooping to personal attacks or responding in kind with any accusations or imputations.

In addition, the fact that Detroit Congressman, John Conyers, African Nationalist Detroit City Councilwoman, JoAnn Watson, former Detroit police chief, Isaiah McKinnon PhD, and a number of other prominent African-American leaders endorsed Proposal M was also helpful in dealing with these attacks.

For the most part, the reaction from elected officials toward Proposal M was based upon pure, political self-interest and had nothing to do with the merits of the issue itself.

The Governor of Michigan, Jennifer Granholm, was a weak and indecisive Democrat who had to deal with a legislature totally controlled by conservative Republicans. In an effort to appear "tough on drugs," and inoculate herself against attacks by social conservatives, she officially came out against Proposal M - but never actually gave a reason why and let her surrogates do the talking.

Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, seeking to rehabilitate his self-created image as a local "party boy" and womanizer, actually broke a promise of neutrality he made to DCCC a year prior and came out against medical marijuana in Detroit.

In addition, he persuaded his mother, Congresswoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (who, in fact, has a good record on drug policy reform issues) to withdraw her original endorsement of Proposal M, claiming she "misunderstood the proposal" and only favored a "statewide solution."

Of all those who opposed us for the record, only Councilwoman Alberta Tinsley Talabi, Co-Chairperson of the PDFD acted out of any true conviction, openly acknowledging that many of her family had substance abuse problems. Therefore, she would fight anything which had the potential to "legalize drugs" in any way, shape or form.

Ironically, DCCC's most powerful and effective supporter, Talabi's fellow Detroit City Council member, JoAnn Watson, a tough, fiery, streetwise, African-nationalist, and community organizer, who had her own TV talk show, was the other politician who acted out of conviction. Her sister died of breast cancer at age 49, and the only drug proven to be effective during her last days was marijuana.

Beyond Councilwoman Watson, some of those who supported DCCC did so because they had received heavy campaign contributions over the years from me and other steering committee members, and/or believed the issue would win anyway and wanted to be on the bandwagon when the votes were counted.

Still others, such as Congressman John Conyers and Council President Maryann Mahaffey, were so deeply entrenched in office that there was no risk of serious political repercussions, and hence were free to do the right thing.

Perhaps DCCC's biggest coup was securing an unspoken agreement from both the Wayny County Prosecutor and the Sheriff, both principled African-American politicians, to just remain silent on the issue. In essence, these leaders personally believed in medical marijuana for truly sick people, and recognized that Proposal M was no threat to their power anyway because they could always charge marijuana users under state law, if circumstances dictated. In addition, their political mode of operation (both of them, due to quirks of fate, had come into office by appointment rather then election) was to focus on doing their jobs the best way possible, rather then demagoging the latest hot-button crime or tragedy for the TV cameras.

For the most part, however, the typical Detroit politician really preferred to hide, and would slant comments either for or against the issue depending upon what they thought the audience in front of them wanted to hear.

In reality, with the exception of Councilwoman Talabi and Mayor Kilpatrick, the elected officials who were publicly against Proposal M simply engaged in lip service, and made no serious attempt to fight us. The Governor, aside from allowing her "drug czar" and a couple other staff persons to fight our proposal on their taxpayer-provided salaries, never spent any serious political capital.

As for the Mayor, after getting his mother to withdraw her endorsement, he appeared on some TV news shows shortly before the vote and denounced Proposal M as "bad for our kids" and "a threat to the progress Detroit has made" under his administration. He also brought his political muscle to bear on the 13th and 14th Congressional Democratic Party District organizations, strong-arming them into breaking their pledge of neutrality to DCCC and, instead, coming out against Proposal M just three days before the vote on August 4th. Significantly, this was already too late to impact absentee voters.

In the final analysis, it was all too little and too late. DCCC's powerful direct mail piece had already done its work with likely voters. In addition, Detroit voters couldn't care less about the Governor's problems, real or imaginary, with the religious right. And they knew the Mayor was simply posturing to shake off his "party boy" image in anticipation of the 2005 election.

As far as the news media is concerned, DCCC made a strategic decision not to court or seek out their attention. No press releases were ever issued during the entire campaign. The hysteria generated by PDFD did all the work for us, insuring the media would come to us for a response anyway. When they did, we were direct, honest and, most of all, constantly on message with our "medicine for sick people" mantra. Any attempt to twist the subject to anything else was met with the same basic answer.

Our primary media piece, was a "fact sheet" done in the style of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) popular with websites (in fat, it was a printed version of the FAQ from our website), answering every imaginable attack line or question against medical marijuana. If the media person appeared hostile, confused or dishonest, we politely terminated the interview, and handed them our fact sheet or referred them to our web site, suggesting they "explore the issue in more detail, and get back with us when you have the time."

If the media person was honest and sincere, we gave them unlimited time and courtesy.

In the end, the editorial pages of both of Detroit's major daily newspapers came out against Proposal M. The Detroit News said it was a matter for the state Legislature; the Detroit Free Press attacked the proposal because our language did not limit prescribing authority to MD's, but essentially allowed any licensed medical practitioner (including nurses, psychologists etc.) to recommend marijuana. The African-American Pres, consisting of three different newspapers, was totally silent on the question, not even covering the story in any form until after the election was over. The broadcast media were fairly honest and objective in their coverage.

The bottom line is that DCCC had done its homework, lining up support early in the game and targeting likely voters well in advance.

In addition, support for medical marijuana is now so deeply rooted among mainstream voters that the political and media elite have virtually no power to alter the equation, once the question is put to a vote of the people.

When the final tally was announced on August 4th, DCCC had won the election with 60% of the vote - the exact margin the MPP poll had projected.

Detroit Proposal M, was now the first serious drug policy reform initiative victory in the Midwestern United States.

The Michigan political and media establishment was stunned by our win. And even more shocked by the margin of victory. The story was front page news across the state and on all mainstream radio and TV outlets.

When the vote numbers hit late in the hour on August 3rd, opposition leaders and politicians refused to talk to the media regarding Proposal M. The net day, PDFD street organizer Andre Johnson, speaking on a major radio talk show, predicted a massive wave of marijuana related crime and a big spike in drug addiction, as a result of Proposal M.

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